Yoh, dudes.
A couple of days back I came across this article on The Economist magazine about this recent probe by Brithish antitrust authority into the suspected collusion of price-fixing by serveral of Brit's largest grocery retailers and supermarket chains. Interestingly I found a lot of terms familiar from econs lessons. Hope it can get you to ponder upon the issue using the theories we have learnt and revise some of the concepts.
Investigating price-fixing
Supermarket sweep
May 1st 2008From The Economist print edition
A complicated investigation of Britain's supermarkets looks like the latest example of the use in Europe of American trustbusting techniques. However, in other areas of competition policy deep differences remain.
A FIERCER business battle would be hard to find than that for the £110 billion ($220 billion) that Britons spend on groceries each year. Over the past decade shoppers have switched from one supermarket to another in their millions, crowning new kings of the trade and deposing its once undisputed lords, whose market shares have been as squishy as overripe tomatoes. The greatest winners have been shoppers themselves: they have more choice than ever, and real food prices in Britain fell by about 7% between 2000 and 2007 (though they are rising now, as global food inflation bites).
Yet amid this energetic jousting for market share, a dark secret may also lie at the heart of British retailing. On April 24th and 25th the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), a British competition watchdog, pounced on the four biggest supermarkets—Tesco, Asda, Sainsbury's and Morrisons—in what may turn out to be one of the world's biggest and most widespread investigations into the possibility of price-fixing. The investigation involves thousands of products, from soap to cola, and some of the world's largest consumer-goods companies. Suppliers that say they have been asked to hand over information to the OFT include Britvic, Coca-Cola, Mars, Nestlé, Procter & Gamble, Reckitt Benckiser and Unilever.
The probe will be a stern test not just of whether Britain's biggest consumer markets are clean, but also of a new approach to tackling price-fixing using American-style trustbusting powers. For even though Europe and America differ profoundly on how to deal with dominant firms and mergers. Europe is enthusiastically adopting the American policy of giving immunity to whistleblowers, a technique that has led to the discovery of cartels in the oddest places.
Fighting in the aisles
The British grocery market is one of the places you would least expect to find price-fixing. Large supermarkets have little reason to collude in the market as a whole. If they did, their reputations would be ruined. And in an industry characterised by economies of scale, keener prices generate not only bigger sales but also lower costs. Internet shopping has increased the pressure: customers can compare prices easily from their own homes.
Sainsbury's, Britain's oldest supermarket, has tumbled in recent years from its long-held spot as the country's favourite grocer to a mere third place. Tesco, meanwhile, has climbed from number two in 1992, with barely one-sixth of the market, to become the clear leader, with almost one-third, according to TNS, a research company (see chart). There are many reasons for Tesco's advance, but price probably ranks high: Christopher Hogbin of Bernstein Research, a firm of investment analysts, reckons its prices are on average about 4-5% lower than those of either Sainsbury's or Morrisons.

Moreover, supermarkets were largely given a clean bill of health on April 30th by the Competition Commission, another British antitrust authority, after an investigation lasting almost two years. Although it was concerned that
supermarkets are buying from ever fewer big suppliers these days,
which makes it easier for price-fixing to take root, the commission found no evidence that this was actually happening. Its main concerns were to tweak planning laws to get more competition between supermarkets and to make sure big chains do not bully their suppliers.
Every economics student learns that cartels are most likely to crop up when firms have least protection from cut-throat price competition. The typical cartel product—vitamins, paper, petrol, glass, bulk chemicals—is a commodity offering scant opportunity for the branding that might create some pricing power. The industry is usually mature, with stable market shares and little innovation. This dullness has a virtue for a would-be cartel: it makes it easy to check if rival firms are sticking to the market-rigging plan.
With so much theory stacked against the likelihood of price-fixing in groceries, the OFT's unprecedented probe has also drawn unprecedented fire. To many of the supermarkets, which insist they have done nothing wrong, the regulator is on a “fishing expedition”. Yet the OFT is fishing in very specific waters. Its requests have generally been narrow and precise.
It has asked, for instance, for communications between supermarket buyers and named suppliers about specific products at particular times, according to people familiar with the requests. In most cases, the regulator has asked for correspondence relating to defined blocks of time of about 12 weeks, ranging from 2005 to 2008.
Why buyers? They may have an incentive to cheat, even if the industry as a whole is fiercely competitive. Often they are free to set selling prices and are paid bonuses linked to targets on sales and profits relating to the products they manage.
A little-noticed footnote to the Competition Commission's interim reports last year provides another clue. Its review of e-mails found that a supplier had “volunteered” information to a retailer on another retailer's expected future prices. Exchanging information on future pricing of this sort, says Catriona Munro of Maclay Murray & Spens, a law firm, may well be an infringement of competition law. The e-mails also point to the possibility of a problem deep in the bellies of large organisations, rather than at the top.
It would be wrong to presume guilt on anyone's part at the beginning of an investigation. The regulator, which is not commenting on the case, has yet to accuse anyone of wrongdoing and, even if it finds evidence of skulduggery, is unlikely to do so for at least a year. Yet the level of detail in its requests suggest that the OFT has a clear idea of what it is looking for and hints at the possibility that this probe was sparked by a tip-off by one of the parties involved, the likeliest suspect being one of the big supermarkets.
If that is so, it would not be the first time in Britain that the combination of a threat of stiff penalties (firms may be fined a maximum of 10% of sales) and amnesty for those who confess has set the watchdogs running. Last year the OFT fined British Airways £121.5m for setting fuel surcharges in cahoots with Virgin Atlantic, which squealed first. Several supermarkets and dairies owned up to fixing milk prices and agreed to pay fines of £116m, also last year. Then on April 25th the OFT accused 11 retailers and two tobacco companies of fixing the price of cigarettes between 2000 and 2003.
The common thread that runs through these investigations is the role of whistleblowers: in milk, Arla, a dairy, came forward; in cigarettes, one of the supermarkets, Sainsbury's, confessed.
This reliance on whistleblowers has been imported from America. Trustbusters there have made deals with cartel members for decades, but two changes in the early 1990s made the practice far more effective. The hitherto informal process was given legal backing: the first conspirator to rat on his partners automatically gets full immunity from criminal prosecution. And convicted executives became more likely to go to prison.
Punishment and predictability
Terry Calvani, formerly a member of the Federal Trade Commission, an American regulator, believes the crucial elements of an effective leniency programme are strong sanctions, transparency and predictability. Mr Calvani, now at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, a law firm, says that significant penalties—ideally prison—raise the cost of not ratting; transparency is necessary so that firms know precisely how the system works; and “amnesty policy outcomes” have to be predictable or cartel members will not risk confessing.
After a false start, the European Commission revamped its cartel policy in 2002, making the conditions for amnesty much clearer. At the same time the fines levied on convicted cartels started to increase, inducing more firms to come clean. John Pheasant of Hogan & Hartson, a law firm, reckons cartels are now fined more heavily in Europe than in America. Last year, for instance, four firms were fined a total of €992m ($1.5 billion) for rigging the markets for elevators in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Leniency seems to be such a success that the European Commission is sitting on what Mr Pheasant calls a “time bomb” of cartel investigations, with more than 200 applications for leniency on file.
Better still for trustbusters, one successful case often begets another confession. When InBev, a brewer, was convicted for its role in a Belgian beer cartel, the firm quickly owned up to price-fixing in several other European countries. As a result, the commission subsequently nabbed three Dutch brewers, fining them €274m for fixing beer prices last year. It is not yet clear whether the OFT's latest investigation had its roots in an earlier run-in between supermarkets and regulators. If it did, it would fit with the pattern seen elsewhere.
Still, it may represent the shape of things to come. What is known of the OFT's new investigation suggests something far more complicated than the standard textbook cartel: it concerns a wide range of branded goods rather than a direct agreement about a single, often dull, product. Like other recent British cases, it seems to involve many parties sharing information in complex and indirect ways. If such an intricate cartel existed, how it could be centrally guided and monitored by its members is hard to fathom. This may also suggest that any arrangements may have been merely transitory. But only after Britain's trustbusters have sifted the minute evidence will shoppers know whether they have been the victims of a new form of price-fixing.
A few questions to think about after reading the article:
1. what is characteristic of American-styled trustbusting methods?
2.referring to one of the lines in red: why 'keener prices generate not only bigger sales but also lower costs'?
3.referring to another few lines in read: why nowadyas 'supermarkets are buying from ever fewer big suppliers these days' and why it 'makes it easier for price-fixing to take root'?
4. the article refers to the probe by Birtish anti trust authorities as a 'fishing expedition'. what is the incentive of being so cautious and stringent? in other words, what might be the danger of being lax?
For more info on trust-busting and American anti-trust laws, kindly refer to the sites below
Posted by Yitian